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Previous studies characterize some of the Former Soviet Central Asian countries (CACs) as 
“more open” (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and others as “more isolated” (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan) depending on their trade-over-GDP level. Being an open or isolationist 
economy has resulted respectively in more or less suitable environment for business and 
investment. We investigate this by measuring contributions of country-specific properties and 
networking factors in 185 bilateral CACs trade flows over the period 1995-2011. We find that, 
even though all CACs’ trade has increased greatly since 1995, for the more open economies 
(Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) trade changes are mainly explained by networking (bilateral) 
factors while for isolationist economies (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) changes in 
trade are mostly explained by country-specific properties. 
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Openness and isolation: The trade performance of the Former Soviet Central Asian 
countries 
 
Introduction 
While much of the literature on Post-Soviet transition has focused on the experiences of the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation, the Central Asian Countries 
(CACs) have received relatively less attention. 1  There is no study focusing on the trade 
determinants and performance of CACs, even though it has been recognized that there is a strong 
correlation between success in transition from plan to market and foreign trade performance 
(Kaminski et al., 1996).  
In addition, much of the existing literature has tended to treat the CACs as relatively 
homogenous. However, after more than two decades of independence, important differences are 
emerging. In terms of trade performance, the trade/GDP ratio over the period 1995-2011 is much 
higher for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (38% on average) than for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan (26% in average) as evident from Figure 1. This ranking also corresponds to that 
in the 2013 World Bank “Doing Business” report (Table 1), which reflects the ease of doing 
business, tax collection, investor protection, access to credit, trading across borders, corruption, 
economic freedom and competitiveness. Kazakhstan (49th out of 183 countries) is the highest 
ranking CAC, followed by Kyrgyzstan (70), Tajikistan (141), and Uzbekistan (154) while 
Turkmenistan is not ranked at all. This perhaps illustrates the close ties between trade openness 
and overall politico-economic reforms. 
- Figure 1 here - 
- Table 1 here – 
The standard transition literature emphasises a combination of initial conditions and the 
reform policies adopted during the transition period (Falcetti et al., 2005 present a good review). 
Both initial conditions and, especially, reform policies vary substantially. Trade performance 
                                                            
1 Some notable exceptions are Rumer (1996, 2000, 2002), Burghart and Sabonis-Helf (2004), Pomfret (2000 and 
2003a), Starr (2004), Hausmann et al. (2005), Dowling and Wignaraja (2005, 2006), and UNDP (2005) which focus 
on general economic development and political issues.  
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clearly reflects, in part, initial conditions, such as resource abundance, geography, transport 
infrastructure, specialization, colonial ties, and so on (Elbourgh-Woytek, 2003; Christopher, 
2007; Pomfret, 2011; Sinitsina, 2012; Suvankulov and Guc, 2012). These are quite 
heterogeneous, as we discuss below. However, there is also a strong contrast in terms of reforms 
enacted since the mid 1990s, as measured by the EBRD transition indicators (Stark and Ahren, 
2012). It is not easy to disentangle the effects of varied initial conditions from those of ongoing 
reforms, and this is made even harder by a changing global and regional environment which 
impacts the different players to varied degrees. 
In the paper, we investigate what factors are more important for each individual CAC by 
measuring proportional share of country-specific properties and networking factors in bilateral 
trade flows, utilizing the gravity concept (e.g., Head et al., 2010; Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk, 
2010) that explains bilateral trade in terms of country “masses” (country-specificities) and 
“distances” (networking). By taking a ratio of the ratios of bilateral trade, we can separate 
country-specific from networking (bilateral) factors. Our analysis of 185 CACs bilateral trade 
observations, based on a 37 country panel covering the 1995-2011 period shows that: (i) 
networking factors explain 50% or more of changes in Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s trade 
flows and 5-14% of changes in Turkmenistan’s, Uzbekistan’s and Tajikistan’s trade; (ii) 75% of 
changes in the 185 bilateral CACs’ trade flows are mainly explained by country specific 
properties, i.e., monadic driven trade; (iii) 25% of the 185 bilateral CACs’ trade flows are 
explained by networking (bilateral) factors such as transport costs, landlockedness and RTAs, i.e., 
dyadic driven trade; (iv) open CACs are more sensitive to global and regional changes compared 
to isolationist CACs.  
 
2 Context, literature and hypotheses 
The CACs context 
All the CACs became independent in 1991. Similarities in initial conditions reflect their history, 
geographic closeness and cultures. CACs populations originate from the same Turkic tribes. 
Historically, all were colonized by Tsarist Russia and belonged to the Soviet Union for over 70 
years. All are geographically landlocked. CACs differ in terms of neighbours, land sizes and 
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landscape, size of population, endowment of natural resources, and historic production 
specialization. Kazakhstan possesses the largest territory, borders with Russia and China and has 
relatively better rail and road connections left from Soviet times. It is well endowed with oil, coal, 
metals and agricultural land. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are mountainous, smaller in 
size and population and have mountain borders with China and Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has a 
relatively large population, possesses substantial natural gas reserves and good conditions for 
cotton production. Turkmenistan is much more sparsely populated, but well endowed with 
natural gas. 
Pomfret (2006) among others concludes that transition reforms proceeded faster in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and slower in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. EBRD 
transition indicators (Table 2) show a similar ranking in terms of privatization and price 
liberalization - policies which are an important stage of ongoing transitional reforms (Barlow and 
Radulescu, 2005). Although Uzbekistan did well with price liberalization in the mid 1990s, kept 
enterprises under state control and has been slow with other reforms. Gas-rich Turkmenistan has 
been reluctant to make substantial changes in its economy, although after the death of the 
president Nyazov in 2006 the country has begun to liberalize. Tajikistan went through a civil war 
(1992-1997) and has been slow to implement reforms. 
- Table 2 here - 
The CACs faced huge trade and production hardships with the Soviet collapse and 
subsequent hyperinflation in 1991-1996. Within a year of independence trade with Russia fell 
tenfold (Sinitcina, 2012). Later, in 1998-1999, CACs were hit by the Russian financial crisis. 
Despite these circumstances, countries were already beginning to diverge in terms of 
international integration – particularly, though not exclusively with Russia. Already by 1998 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had joined several major RTAs with Russia, including 
the CISFTA in 1994, EurAsEc and SCO in 1996 while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were only 
observers (see Appendix 2). CACs trade with Russia was damaged substantially by the 1998 
crisis, especially those countries which had engaged in integration (Westin ,1999). The more 
isolationist Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had less exposure. The period 2000-2007 was more 
fruitful as world prices for the CACs’ primary export goods (oil, gas, cotton) accelerated and 
volumes of trade and FDI inflows, mainly from China and Europe, increased. The main 
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beneficiaries were the more open economies, but Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also benefited 
from a global boom and increasing global gas demand, negotiating with China and Iran to reduce 
their dependence on the Russian market. The 2008 crisis had both direct and indirect effects on 
the CAC’s trade and economic wellbeing. The exposure of Kazakhstan’s banks to the global 
financial crisis spread to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which had 
more limited financial links with other CACs, Russia and rest of the world where originally less 
affected by the crisis. 
 
Literature and hypotheses 
Since the late 1990s, all CACs have experienced strong growth of both exports and imports – 
exports rising by over 300 per cent in the cases of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Table 1), 
compared to 247 per cent for Uzbekistan, 144 per cent for Tajikistan and 100 per cent for 
Kyrgyzstan. However, the drivers of this growth differ considerably across the countries 
(consistent with Levy, 2007). In the case of the slower reformers, trade growth has been driven 
almost entirely by economic growth of principal export markets (notably Russia), by the boom in 
oil and gas prices and by the associated growth of local GDP: in other words, by country-specific 
factors and the global/regional environment, with little evidence of contribution from reforms. 
Therefore we propose an explicit modification to the general transition country 
performance framework as presented in Figure 2. Not only should analysis of trade 
developments take account of heterogeneous initial conditions and differential reforms, but also 
of the different developments in socio-economic variables for different countries (notably trade 
partners’ growth and growth in global demands for their principal export commodities). This 
approach allows us to differentiate between one group of countries whose exports have grown 
despite a lack of trade cost reform (indeed, whose fortune in terms of export commodity demand 
may well have helped to avoid reform), versus another whose exports growth is because reforms 
reduced trade costs.2 
                                                            
2 Some early papers recognized that the feedback effect of growth to reforms is likely to be important, and they took 
this into account in their estimation procedure. These include Heybey and Murrell (1999) and Wolf (1999), who 
allow for a feedback of growth to structural reforms. Berg et al. (1999) and Ghosh (1997) also recognize the 
potential endogeneity of stabilization and adopt an instrumental variables approach to control for this. De Melo et al. 
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- Figure 2 here - 
 
CACs heterogeneity: Openness and isolation 
Auty (2001), World Bank (2002), Pomfret (2004), Felipe and Kumar (2010) point out that there 
is a strong correlation between the resource abundance and trade performance of the CACs. 
Acharya et al. (2011) assert the impact of colonial ties with former Soviet countries on current 
trade patterns. Limao and Venables (2001) find that trade performance is affected by high 
overland transport costs of goods. Christopher (2007) compares transport infrastructure and 
logistics services in CACs, while Raballand (2003) emphasizes the variation in landlockedness 
of each CAC. Kaser (1998) and Luong (2002) link economic performance to variation in 
political regimes, as Kazakhstan is characterized as “populist with soft autocracy”, Kyrgyzstan as 
“dualist with electoral democracy”, and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as “centralist 
with hard autocracy”. Rani (2009) compares the effects of more liberal policies in Kyrgyzstan or 
Kazakhstan with restrictive policies in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Tai and Lee 
(2009) emphasise bureaucratic barriers to trade: investors spend 20% (in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan) and 48% (in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) of their time to deal with 
unnecessary bureaucracy. A recent IMF Survey (IMF, 2012) finds a strong correlation between 
political regime and trade policies of CACs. Using the 2010 World Bank Governance Indicators 
(WGI), Magilevski (2012) points out the heterogeneity of governance efficiency; out of 230 
countries, Kazakhstan ranks 138, Kyrgyzstan 171, Tajikistan 187, Uzbekistan 199, and 
Turkmenistan 201. The importance of governance environment for trade is also emphasized by 
Wu et al. (2012). Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Given the heterogeneity, not just of CACs’ initial conditions and reform policies, but 
also of changes in the socio-economic environment, the importance of factors affecting each 
country trade performance will differ across countries. 
 
Networking (bilateral trade cost) and country-specific factors 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(2001) estimate the impact of initial conditions on growth in two stages allowing first for an indirect impact on 
reforms (see also Krueger and Ciolko, 1998). 
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Appendix 2 lists the more important RTAs in the region. Kazakhstan is an active member of 
several RTAs. Kazakhstan proposed the idea of a Eurasian Common Economic Space (ECES) 
and has helped form the Eurasian Custom Union (EACU), encouraging other CACs to join. 
Besides re-establishing ties with Former Soviet countries, Kazakhstan has developed good 
economic relationships with the EU and China. Kyrgyzstan is currently in the process of joining 
the EACU, and is the only CAC belonging currently to the WTO. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
have been more cautious about RTAs. Unlike Uzbekistan, Tajikistan is interested in the ECES 
formation, whereas Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have been more concerned with sovereignty 
and resistant to changes. Uzbekistan, which was a member of EurAsEC in 1996, later withdrew 
in 2008. Both countries are observers in CISFTA but show no interest in either ECES or EACU.  
Integration depends on past and current economic interests, political and economic 
sovereignty and similarity in production/consumption preferences of CACs and their trading 
partners. Acharya et al. (2011) point out that RTAs in the CACs region are mainly with Former 
Soviet states (see Figure 3). Suvankulov and Guc (2012) present measures of trade 
complementary, the level of similarity of traded goods and preferences that explain RTA 
formations within CACs and with neighbouring China and Russia. Magilevski (2012) 
emphasises economic interests in forming CAC trade partnerships. CACs desire access to 
Russian, Chinese and European export markets, and to import cheaper or of better quality goods 
and obtain investments and technologies. In return, the CACs’ partners desire access to their 
natural resources.  
- Figure 3 here - 
While all CACs have a lot in common (landlockedness, culture, history, etc.), their trade 
patterns are quite different. Kazakhstan is the largest CAC in terms of trade (more than 60% of 
the total), followed by Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (around 15% each) while Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan contribute the least (around 5% each) as it is evident form Table 3. As well as GDP 
size, the scale of trade engagement reflects resource endowments, trade specialisation, 
production volumes, political systems, etc. Trade specialisation of each CAC is influenced by 
resource endowments: oil, coal, metals and grain are the prime exporting commodities for 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are rich in natural gas and have favourable conditions 
for cotton production, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are mineral and precious metal rich. 
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Tajikistan as well as Kyrgyzstan has a huge amount of fresh water resources that could supply 
the entire CACs region with hydroelectric energy.  
- Table 3 here - 
While all countries have relatively authoritarian regimes, there are still considerable 
differences in political systems (IMF, 2012). Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are more liberal 
compared to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Reflecting this, economic liberalisation 
of each CAC (Appendix 1) is at different stages. There are many other related country-specific 
features (majority and minority population make up, liberalisation level, FDI level and so on) 
that effect CACs trade performance. The fact that some CACs (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan) have higher level of government intervention and state control in their economies 
compared to others (Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) where economy is more liberal and relatively 
more influenced by regional or global economic condition brings us to the hypothesis: 
H2: The growth and variability in open CACs trade is driven primarily by the 
development of networking (bilateral) factors, whereas that of the more isolationist 
countries mainly reflects country-specific (including socio-economic) factors. 
 
3 Methodology and data 
The gravity concept 
We utilise the gravity model of trade (GMT). A modified form of the Newton's gravity equation, 
this predicts bilateral trade flows based on economic sizes and geographic distance of two 
trading countries (Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk, 2010). The GMT has been proven to be consistent 
with empirical findings, and to which have been added theoretical foundatons (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003; Bergstrand, 1989; Deardorff, 1998; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Chaney, 2008; 
Helpman et al., 2008). We start with Anderson and van Wincoop’s (AvW, 2003) theory-based 
GMT which takes the following form:  
 ݔ௜௝ ൌ ௬೔௬ೕ௬ೢ ሺ
௧೔ೕ
௉೔௉ೕሻ
ଵିఙ, (1) 
9 
 
where ݔ௜௝ is nominal exports from country i to country j, ݕ௜ and ݕ௝ are economic sizes of country 
i and j, respectively, ݕ௪  is world economic size, ݐ௜௝  is trade cost, ௜ܲ  and ௝ܲ  are the respective 
price indexes, and ߪ is the elasticity of substitution.34 
World economic size equals the sum of nominal incomes of all countries j, ݕ௪ ൌ ∑ ݕ௝௝ . 
Theoretically, the economic size of country i (ݕ௜) is equal to the gross consumption of goods 
(produced in country i) by country j at a price (݌௜௝) that differs from j’s domestic price level by 
the inclusion of a trade cost (ݐ௜௝): 
 ݕ௜ ൌ ∑ ܿ௜௝௝ ݌௜௝. (2) 
Country j’s economic size (ݕ௝) is calculated analogously. It is common practice in a gravity 
analysis to weight the economic size using the nominal GDP of the country. 
The central contribution of AvW (2003) is the concept of multilateral resistance to trade 
(MRT). The outward trade resistance, ௜ܲ  and inward trade resistance, ௝ܲ  are price indices that 
take into account the weighted aggregate values of observable traded costs across all possible 
export partners of i and import partners of j respectively, and take the form of CES unit cost 
functions: 
 ௜ܲ ൌ ሺ∑ ௝ܲఙିଵߠ௝ݐ௜௝ଵିఙ௝ ሻ
భ
భష഑, 
 
(3) 
 ௝ܲ ൌ ሺ∑ ௜ܲఙିଵߠ௜ݐ௜௝ଵିఙ௜ ሻ
భ
భష഑. 
 
(4) 
While MRT terms are not directly observable, gravity studies provide methods5 to proxy them. 
                                                            
3 Note that equation (1) follows AvW (2003) in assuming imports and exports have a proportional effect on bilateral 
trade; however, this assumption can easily be relaxed, as we do later in our estimated equations. 
4 The elasticity of substitution should be larger than one, ߪ >1, but exact values may change as preferences and trade 
opportunities change. The debates over precise level of elasticity of substitution have been on going for quit long, 
and it seems there is still no consensus what it should be like. For example, some papers use relatively low ߪ; for 
example Backus et al. (1994) use 1.5 and Coeurdacier et al. (2007) use 0.6-2. Other papers use relatively high ߪ; for 
example, Hummels (2001) at around 9 and Romalis (2007) chooses 11. However, since Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
and AvW (2004), many trade papers tend to pick value somewhere between 5-10, although some papers have 
estimated it instead. 
5 AvW (2003) proposed an iterative procedure to estimate MRT terms based on non-linear least squares but because 
of its complexity it was overshadowed by simpler proxies such as “remoteness” or fixed effect dummies. 
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AvW (2003) assume that trade costs, tij, are symmetric, and of “iceberg” form (Samuelson, 
1952): 
 ݐ௜௝ ൌ ∑ ሺݖ௜௝௠ሻఊ೘௠ୀଵ , 
 
(5) 
where ݖ௜௝௠  is a function of bilateral trade barriers (transport cost, tariffs, quotas etc.) and the 
parameter ߛ௠. The geographic distance between trading countries i and j can serve as proxy of 
transport cost. 
 
The gravity decomposition 
The GMT is a simple model with strong predictive power, and has been extensively used for 
empirical studies since its first implementation by Tinbergen (1962). Researchers have 
developed extension and decomposition techniques to allow the GMT to measure overall trade 
costs (AvW, 2004; Head and Mayer, 2010; Jacks and Novy, 2009) or unobservable MTRs (AvW, 
2003; Bayer and Bergstrand, 2009). 
We make use of a gravity consistent extension of the AvW procedure called the “tetrad” 
method (see Head and Mayer, 2010). This allows us to capture time varying bilateral effects (for 
instance, caused by changes in tariffs or non-tariff measures) on trade volumes by eliminating 
(by division) all importer, exporter, and global (time) effects as well as fixed bilateral effects 
(such as distance or colonial ties). In addition to exporter i and importer j countries, we need to 
take another two countries, one as reference exporter l and another as reference importer k. So by 
taking a “tetrad” of (1) with ij, ik, lj and lk sets and denoting it as Ն, it can be represented as 
 Նሺ௜௟ሻሺ௝௞ሻ ൌ ௫೔ೕ ௫೔ೖ⁄௫೗ೕ ௫೗ೖ⁄ , 
 
(6) 
which then through elimination of monadic ( ௬೔௬ೕ௬ೢሺ௉೔௉ೕሻభష഑) and fixed dyadic terms (ݐ௜̅௝) can be 
reduced to “tetrad” of ߮s: 
 Նሺ௜௟ሻሺ௝௞ሻ ൌ ఝ೔ೕ ఝ೔ೖ⁄ఝ೗ೕ ఝ೗ೖ⁄ , 
(7) 
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where ߮௜௝ ൌ ൫ݐ௜௝ െ ݐపఫതതത൯ଵିఙ is a measure of time-varying observable and unobservable trade-cost 
factors. Although ߮s contain elasticity of substitution, no assumption about the level of elasticity 
needs to be imposed which is crucially important since exogenously introduced level of elasticity 
is always questionable. The CES elasticity of substitution parameter should be larger than one 
but exact values may change as preferences and trade opportunities change.6 
Unlike traditional fixed effect methods, the tetrad approach allows for time-varying changes 
in relative trade costs across different country pairs. For example, Head et al. (2010) analyse the 
time varying effect of independence on trade between a metropolis (colonizer), colony and 
siblings (other colonies), to capture the effect of other relevant bilateral factors (changes in RTA, 
GATT membership and currency rates). Romalis (2007) used the approach to evaluate the effect 
of NAFTA tariffs on trade flows among USA, Mexico and Canada. Our purpose is to decompose 
the GMT into two parts: 
 ݔ௜௝ ൌ ܦ௜௝ܯ௜,௝, 
 
(8) 
where the dyad, ܦ௜௝, stand for varying overall trade measure powered by trade elasticity, 1 െ ߪ. 
The dyad represents the country-pair-specific (ij) networking or trade cost component of trade: 
 ܦ௜௝ ൌ ߮௜௝. 
 
(9) 
The monad, ܯ௜,௝, is the combination of the country specific components for each country in the 
pair ij: economic size and MRT. This is derived by eliminating ܦ௜௝ from (1): 
 ܯ௜,௝ ൌ ௬೔௬ೕ∑ ௬ೕೕ ሺ௉೔௉ೕሻభష഑. 
 
(10) 
 
Data 
                                                            
6 While some studies try to estimate (e.g., Chen and Novy, 2010) or calibrate (e.g., Balistrery, 2008) the CES 
elasticity parameter, yet it is common for many studies to introduce it exogenously. 
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Our bilateral trade panel contains 37 countries (Table 4) over the period 1995-2011. The 
selection of countries was based on volume of trade with the CACs region. Sadly, data on 1989-
1992 are either missing or if reported are unreliable; these problems also apply to the data for the 
period till 1994 which is characterized by hyperinflation. Consequently, our study starts from 
1995. 
Bilateral trade flows and tariff rates for the 1995-2011 period, in 2007 US dollars were 
obtained from WITS (www.wits.org). This contains both the COMTRADE and TRAINS 
bilateral databases, both of which contain some of the necessary data, as COMTRADE covers 
only WTO members, while TRAINS covers all the CACs, but aggregates the EU into one single 
region. The other issue was that one third of all trade data for some countries was missing or 
unreported; consequently we had to use interpolation which allowed reduction of missing trade 
data from 1/3 to 1/5.  
GDP levels were obtained from IMF International Financial Statistics Database 
(www.imf.org ), while geographic distances between capital cities of the countries and standard 
gravity dummies for colonization, common language, common border were obtained from CEPII 
(www.cepii.fr). Additional dummies for landlockedness and RTA membership were also 
included. Summary statistics, description of variables and correlation matrixes are reported in 
Table 5 and Table 6 respectively. 
 
The estimation model 
We estimate a set of log-linear models. First, we consider a standard OLS model with fixed 
effect dummies: 
 ݈݊ݔ௜௝௧ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵ݈݊ݕ௜௧ ൅ ܽଶ݈݊ݕ௝௧ ൅ ܽଷ݈݊ݐ௜௝௧ ൅ ܽସܫ௜௧ ൅ ܽହܫ௝௧ ൅ ܽ଺ܫ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧, 
 
(11) 
where ܽ଴ is constant, ܽଷ ൌ 1 െ ߪ is trade elasticity, ߝ௜௝௧ is error term; ܫ௜௧  is exporter-year, ܫ௝௧ is 
importer-year and ܫ௧ represents year binary dummies to proxy ௜ܲ௧ , ௝ܲ௧ and ݕ௪, respectively, for 
theoretical consistency. Our trade costs take the following form: 
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 ݈݊ݐ௜௝ ൌ ܾଵln݀݅ݏݐ௜௝ ൅ ܾଶ ln൫1 ൅ ݐܽݎ݂݅ ௜݂௝௧൯ ൅ ܾଷ݈ܽ݊݃௜௝ ൅ ܾସܿ݋݈௜௝ ൅ ܾହܾ݋ݎ݀௜௝ ൅
ܾ଺݈݈݋ܿ݇௜ ൅ ܾ଻݈݈݋ܿ݇௜௝ ൅ ଼ܾܴܶܣ௜௧ ൅ ܾଽܴܶܣ௜௝௧ ൅ ݑ௜௝௧. 
 
(12) 
In (12), the geographic distance (݀݅ݏݐ௜௝) proxy for transport cost, tariff 7 stands for border cost, 
and further binomial dummies capture effects of historic (common language and colony), 
geographic (sharing borders, one and both landlocked), and economic linkages (one and both in 
RTA) effects on trade cost; u is error term. In the equation time constant variables, unlike time 
variant ones, have no t subscript.   
As previously mentioned, the derived values from tetrading - the dyads - stand for time-
varying bilateral factors, which can be expressed as: 
 ݈݊ݔ௜௝௧ ൌ ݀଴ ൅ ݀ଵ݈݊ݕ௜௧ ൅ ݀ଶ݈݊ݕ௝௧ ൅ ݀ଷ݈݊߮௜௝௧ ൅ ݀ସܫ௜௧ ൅ ݀ହܫ௝௧ ൅ ݀଺ܫ௧ ൅ ߳௜௝௧, 
 
(13) 
where ݈݊߮௜௝௧ is  
 ݈݊߮௜௝௧ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵ݈݊݀݅ݏݐ௜௝ ൅ ܿଶ ln൫1 ൅ ݐܽݎ݂݅ ௜݂௝௧൯ ൅ ܿଷ݈ܽ݊݃௜௝ ൅ ܿସܿ݋݈௜௝ ൅
ܿହܾ݋ݎ݀௜௝ ൅ ܿ଺݈݈݋ܿ݇௜ ൅ ܿ଻݈݈݋ܿ݇௜௝ ൅ ଼ܴܿܶܣ௜௧ ൅ ܿଽܴܶܣ௜௝௧ ൅ ݑ௜௝௧. 
 
(14) 
Feenstra (2004) states that fixed effects model are most reliable and simple method to 
estimate gravity of trade flows. The fixed effect dummies proxy the omitted MRT terms effect. If 
the interest is as in our case to estimate coefficients of time-invariant variables (such as distance) 
then dummy variable least squares (DVLS) method which works the same way as fixed effects 
model is appropriate to use.8 
Potentially, DVLS estimates could suffer from serial correlation, non-stationarity and 
endogeneity. Moreover, DVLS does not take into account zero trade values where it is unknown 
whether these are true zeros or unreported values. In any case zero trade values should not be 
neglected, especially when 1/5 of our observations are zeros. Experts suggest re-estimating GMT 
using other estimators that handle these issues such as TSLS (Two Stage Least Squares) to 
                                                            
7 Taking log of 1+tariff is necessary to account for the cases with zero tariffs in our data. 
8 The fixed effect estimator drops all the variables that are constant over time like distances, therefore, including 
fixed effect dummies produces the same results as the fixed effect estimator but also estimates coefficients for 
constant variables. 
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control for endogeneity bias (Egger, 2009), DVLS (with AR option) for autocorrelation issue 
(Martin and Pham, 2009), PPML (Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood) estimator for inclusion 
of zero trade values, and FDE (First Differencing) model for stationarity of variables as 
discussed by Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk (2010). Following the relevant literature we run tests for 
non-stationarity and co-integration and report the results in Table 7 which shows that some 
variables (GDPs and RTAs) are non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences. 
Furthermore, there seems to be no issues with cointegration of variables. 
 
4 Estimation results 
Gravity model results 
Results are presented in Table 8 where control variables are categorized into country-specific 
factors (importer and exporter GDP), time-invariant bilateral (networking) factors (distance, 
landlockedness, share common borders, common language, and common historical colonizer), 
and time-variant bilateral factors (tariff rates, participation in RTA). The estimates in columns 1 
to 5 are obtained using (1) Dummy Variable Least Squares (DVLS) with robust and cluster 
option, (2) DVLS with AR option, (3) Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS), (4) Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator, and (5) First Differencing model (FDE) respectively.   
Regarding signs, estimated coefficients across different estimators show a logical 
relationship between the explained variable and explanatory variables and agree with correlation 
matrix results (Table 6); trade is positively associated with both exporter and importer GDPs as 
well as with the dummies for a common language, and with the countries being members of the 
same RTA, while in contrast, distance, landlockedness, and tariff rates are negatively correlated 
with trade. However, we observe some sign disagreements of coefficients (depending on 
estimator in use) such as unexpected signs of tariff and colony variables in PPML column. 
Common border is found in many gravity papers to have positive correlation to trade, but only 
TSLS column confirms it in the CACs case. 
Regarding magnitudes, estimated coefficients across all estimators are similar which enables 
us to confirm a range of predictions. DVLS (RC) and DVLS (AR) coefficients are more similar 
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compared to TSLS or PPML ones, indicating that serial correlation is not a severe issue (as 
expected for short time-series panel). Controlling for endogeneity changes some coefficients 
slightly (GDPs, distance, and border), but inclusion of zero trade values produces even more 
change in coefficients for most variables. This is notable from the number of observations in the 
DVLS and TSLS cases (19,522) and in the PPML case (23,273). Inclusion of more observations 
indeed gives more precise estimates, and in fact we observe quite a significant change in 
coefficient values. Despite the improvements in estimates due to inclusion of zero trades it is 
hard to rely on PPML as its goodness of fit is only 59% and lower than the other estimators’ fit 
of 81-82%. FDE compared with DVLS provides coefficients almost twice smaller – a regularity, 
which has been pointed out in Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk (2010).  
Based on equations 13-14 gravity variables are re-estimated and reported in Table 9. 
Comparing the country specific coefficients in Table 9 (part a) and Table 8 confirm that importer 
GDP is more important than the exporter’s, however, DVLS (AR) provides more similar values 
that are in line with GDP coefficients presented in Table 8. In Table 9 (part b) dependent variable 
is a product of a tetrad which is regressed over gravity trade cost variables. Coefficient signs and 
magnitudes are quite similar to ones in Table 8 while coefficients for some variables such as 
landlockedness are significant and quite high, at least for estimates from DVLS, DVLS (AR) and 
PPML, while TSLS values fall well in line with gravity estimates. Estimated coefficients by both 
the gravity and tetrad models can be grouped into two categories according to their economic 
and statistical significance. 
Both statistically and economically significant variables: distance and landlockedness 
A 10% increase in distance leads to a 16-22% decrease in trade. Similar results are obtained by 
Suvankulov and Guc (2012). Usually gravity studies estimate distance coefficient equal to one 
but the geographic distance is indeed important factor when we talk about CACs trade. The huge 
distance of CACs from the major trade centres creates a big obstacle for their goods to be 
competitive in world markets. The effect is exacerbated further by the fact that CACs are 
landlocked having no direct access to sea corridors. A 13-35% or 10-51% trade drops when one 
(exporter or importer) or both traders are landlocked respectively. 
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Only statistically (but not economically) significant variables: RTA membership, GDP levels and 
common border 
To reduce trading costs CACs join RTAs which is beneficial only to those who are in the same 
RTA. A 10% increase in RTA leads to 5-14% trade increase, while if only one country is a RTA 
member trade drops by 0.6-17%. A 10% increase of exporter’s GDP increase trade by 0.6-4.8%, 
while importer’s GDP increase leads to 5.9-8.3% increase in trade meaning that importer’s GDP 
is twice as important in the case of CACs. This finding makes sense when we consider the fact 
that overland transportation costs in trade with CACs are very high and these are passed to 
importers (AvW, 2004). In contrast to other gravity studies, a common border negatively affects 
trade - trade drops by 0.3-1%. This might be explained by the fact that we considering trade of 
landlocked countries which have to pay extra costs associated with crossing territories of 
neighbouring countries in order to export or import goods. Except the PPML results, we find that 
tariffs are statistically but not economically significant as increase in tariff rate by 1% causes 
only about 0.2% trade drop. 
 
Gravity decomposition results 
There are 185 (5 CACs by 37 partners) country pair trade relations decomposed into monadic 
(country-specific) and dyadic (networking) components. By plotting these over the period 1995-
2011, we can observe changes in the trade flows and bilateral relations over time. For simplicity 
trade and dyads obtained only by DVLS estimator and using France and Germany as reference 
importer and export respectively are reported. We find that in 17 years of independence each 
CAC improved its trade with all countries in the pool (37 countries including intra-trade) and 
country-specific and networking factors increased their influence. The changes vary from 
country pair to country pair though, but it is still feasible to categorize results into two groups as 
follows. 
Monadic driven bilateral trade 
In this group of country pairs, a gap appears between trade flow and bilateral trade component 
(dyad) which becomes wider over time. This happens because the slope of growing trade flows is 
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greater than that of the dyadic component. 136 country-pair relationships (or about 75% of all 
bilateral trade) fall into this category. The example of country-pair trade dominated by monadic 
factors is shown in Figure 4 (Plot 1). 
Dyadic driven bilateral trade 
In this group of country pairs trade is increasing at the same rate as dyadic costs do while 
monadic component is constant over time. 49 (or about 25%) country-pair relationships fall into 
this category. The example of dyadic driven country-pair trade is shown in Figure 4 (Plot 2). 
The dyadic and monadic component shares in bilateral trade of each CAC are reported in 
Table 10 and show remarkable heterogeneity in trade behaviour. Detailed information on all 185 
country pairs is reported in Appendix 3.1-3.5, where bilateral trade of each CAC in logs is 
presented along with its split into dyadic (grey shaded rows) and monadic components (in %). 
- Table 10 here - 
Comparing our estimates of dyads (networking effects) with results from the alternative 
method of Novy, which assumes trade elasticity equal to 8, produced similar dynamic changes in 
dyads and overall trade costs over time. This similarity confirms that tetrading can be 
successfully employed for decomposition analysis in the case of CACs. 
 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
Our study confirms the hypotheses in section 2. First of all, while all CACs have experienced 
growing trade since the end of the 1998 Russian crisis, this does not mean that the countries are 
homogeneous. In fact, while they share aspects of culture, history and landlockedness, the CACs 
show considerable variety in initial conditions (size, population, resource base, specialisation). 
Moreover, in terms of transitional reform, there is a considerable divergence between 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in the reformist camp, and the other states. Reform in terms of trade 
tends to be strongly correlated with other transitional reforms. 
Secondly, we note that trade has grown considerably in all countries, reflecting the rise in 
Russian and regional incomes (following stabilisation and oil/gas price recovery). Oil and gas 
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exporters have particularly benefited. However, the evidence is that the more isolationist states 
have simply relied on these, possibly fortuitous factors to boost their trade, whereas the more 
reform-minded states have achieved considerable trade growth through reducing trade costs. 
Hence, the growth and fluctuations in trade of the “more isolationist” economies Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are driven by changes over time in monadic variables (primarily GDP) 
while trade partnerships of “more open” economies Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are driven 
roughly equally by dyadic variables (changes in trade costs) as well as monadic variables. Is 
there other evidence that supports our interpretation? 
Globalization vs. regionalization 
In the era of globalization, countries build more trade connections that raise income and welfare. 
However, there are also some negative implications: not just in terms of trade diversion where 
integration is regional, but also in terms of vulnerability to shocks. For example, during the 1998 
Russian crisis The Euromoney Risk Ranking for Russia went up from 78 (in December 1997) to 
129 (in September 1998). Observing this situation, Fitch IBCA lowered Russian International 
Credit Rating from B+ to CCC-. As a result, Russian interest rates increased from 3% to 6%. 
This had a strong impact upon the CACs, both through monadic effects (GDP in a major export 
market reduced), and through trade costs (since access to finance is important for trade).  
Kazakhstan, with a common border with Russia, was more exposed than Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and was hit by the crisis harder (Westin, 1999), although even the isolationist CACs 
were dependent on Russia as the primary export market for their gas, as dictated by pipeline 
routes. Financial shortages reduced CACs-Russia trade in both directions by 40%. Furthermore, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, in early 1999, rose more sharply for small open CACs, Kyrgyzstan (54%) 
and Tajikistan (90%), and less for large and more diversified Kazakhstan (17%) while for 
isolationist Turkmenistan (1.7%) and Uzbekistan (- 4.4%) the effect was negligible (Pastor and 
Damjanovic, 2001). 
Transport links and RTAs  
The CACs’ location in the heart of Eurasia is strategically important but imposes a disadvantage 
in trade. Overland transport costs of goods average $1.380/1000km, almost 10 times higher than 
by sea ($190/1000km) raising trade costs by 60% as found by Limao and Venables (2001). 
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According to the Eurasian Development Bank Report (2009) CACs main trade flows go in three 
main directions: (i) to Russia and Europe via the Trans-Asian-Railway (Tashkent/Bishkek – 
Dushanbe – Almaty - Moscow/Kiev) or TRACECA (Bishkek – Tashkent – Almaty – Aktau – 
Baku – Batumi); (ii) to Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia via the Central-Railway (Almaty/Bishkek 
– Tashkent – Ashkhabat – Turkmenbashi – Tehran – Istanbul); (iii) to China and Asian-Pacific 
Region via the East-Trans-Asian-Railway (Tashkent - Bishkek/Dushanbe – Dostyk – 
Lianyungang). Since 90% of CACs trade is by rail, Leamer and Levinsohn (1994) rightly assert 
that “distance matters and it matters a lot”.  
Raballand (2003) found that the trade of landlocked Former Soviet Union countries fell by 
80% compared to coastal ones during 1995-1999. Landlocked CACs had to negotiate with 
bordering coastal states, as well as other landlocked states controlling routes (Christopher, 2007). 
For example, Uzbekistan is virtually surrounded by other landlocked countries. Trade barriers 
imposed by (coastal) Russia to landlocked CACs were very high (Djarkov and Freud, 2002). 
Even though Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share a border with coastal China, trade is 
impeded by the Himalaya-Tibet massif, and the only convenient geographic corridor to China is 
the Djunghar Gate of Kazakhstan. Note that the infrastructure and rail roads to China were built 
during the Soviet era mostly with strategic considerations (Christopher, 2007), and partly reflect 
poor Soviet-Chinese relations since the late 1950s. 
While our study finds RTA membership to be statistically insignificant, it potentially allows 
CACs to lessen transport and transit costs as well as to improve regional transport infrastructure 
and create transport corridors. However, the complexity of regional trade partnerships often 
creates additional obstacles. Moreover, most of the regional RTAs (Appendix 2) have had 
relatively little practical importance (Acharya et al., 2011). The major exception is the Eurasian 
Custom Union (EACU) which unifies the external tariffs of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. 
Magilevski (2013) demonstrates the EACU effect by pointing out that the trade turnover between 
Kazakhstan and Russia increased by 28% between 2010-11, while for the same period growth 
rate of trade between the CU and OCAC is 19%. Kyrgyzstan is likely to join the EACU next 
year and Tajikistan is currently negotiating its membership. However, Kassenova (2012) reports 
that despite the EACU formation, Kazakhstan still faces high Russian NTBs. Furthermore, there 
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are serious questions outstanding, especially for those CACs reluctant to reform like 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan who are not showing any sign of interest in the EACU. 
Other important factors of trade 
Other factors of importance are the conditions of access and use of CACs’ transport 
infrastructure (Christopher, 2007), CACs access to sea ports (Kulipanova, 2012), transit systems 
in the region (Raballand, 2003). Trade barriers, indeed, are reaching beyond the transport and 
border costs, and as mentioned in AvW (2004) also include policy costs (tariff and non-tariff like 
quotas), cost of information and currency exchange, finance, distribution costs and trade costs 
associated with unobservable barriers linked to cultural and historic ties. Indeed, trade costs as 
estimated in our gravity formulation will include any costs of business regulation and/or 
corruption. Evans et al. (2000) suggest that political systems, differences in education, 
production, market and industrial structure should be considered as primary factors of trade. 
Dow and Karunaratna (2006) examine 37 different studies to identify main “psychic” distance 
factors. They find that culture, language, education level, religion, time zone, industrial 
development, and political systems are most common factors used in trade studies. Of these 
factors, the latter two are likely to be most relevant for the CACs. Inherited from Soviet days the 
main industries and infrastructure in CACs are quite outdated, but the energy rich CACs 
(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) using oil and gas revenues have been able to 
modernize their industries, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan developed their agrarian sectors. 
Regarding the political system, the IMF Survey (2012) finds a close correlation between 
relatively liberal (more accurately less authoritarian) political systems like in Kyrgyzstan are 
linked to less restrictive trade regimes compared to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. To conclude: 
we find a relationship between being an open/isolationist country and having dyadic/monadic 
driven trade with other countries. Open CACs’ (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) trade performance 
is mostly explained by time varying bilateral factors while the trade performance of isolationist 
CACs (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) is affected mostly by country-specific 
properties.  
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Figure 1 CACs exports, imports and internal trade 
Total Exports (% change) Trade Openness (in % terms) 
  
Total Imports (% change) Total Internal-trade (in % terms) 
Note: The abbreviations KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM and UZB denote Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan respectively. 
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Source: Acharya et al. (2011) 
 
 Figure 4 Illustrative examples of monadic-driven and dyadic-driven trade by country pairs 
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 Table 1 World Bank "Doing Business" indexes for CACs in 2011 
Title  Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan  Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Out of all 
Overall ease of doing business rank 47 70 147 166  183 
Starting a business 57 17 70 96  183 
Protecting investors 10 13 65 133  183 
Ease of paying taxes 13 162 168 157  183 
Ease of getting finances 78 8 177 159  183 
Cross-border Trade ease 176 171 177 183  183 
Corruption Perception Index  120 162 158 174 168 180 
Freedom of Press 170 156 168 189 193 194 
Global Competitiveness   67 122 122   134 
Global Enabling Trade Report 72 109 104 105  118 
Index of Economic Freedom 76 70  130 152 155 
Inward FDI Potential Index 46 110 93 98  140 
Source:  The WB indexes are reported in Sinitsina (2012) & Tray (2013) 
 
 
  
 Table 2 EBRD transition indicators for CACs 
   Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan 
  
1991‐
2000
2001‐
2010
1991‐
2000
2001‐
2010
1991‐
2000 
2001‐
2010
1991‐
2000
2001‐
2010
1991‐
2000
2001‐
2010 
Small scale privatisation 3  0 3 0 2.3  0.7 2 0.3 1 0.3 
Large scale privatisation 2  0 2 0.7 1.3  0 1.7 0 0.7 ‐0.7 
Enterprise restructuring 1  0 1 0 0.7  0.3 0.7 0 0 0 
Price liberalisation 3  0 3.3 0 2.7  0.3 1.7 0 1.7 0 
Trade & Forex system 2.3  0.4 3.3 0 2.3  0 0 1 0 1 
Competition Policy 1  0 1 0 1  ‐0.3 1 ‐0.3 0 0 
Banking reform & Interest rate 
liberalization  1.3  0.4 1 0.3 0  1.3 0.7 0 0 0 
Securities markets & Non bank 
financial institutions 1.3  0.4 1 0 0  0 1 0 0 0 
Overall infrastructure 1  0.7 0.3 0.4 0  0.7 0.3 0.4 0 0 
Note: Numbers presented here are differences between EBRD indicators (of scale is 0 to 4.33) for first (1991-2000) and second (2001-2010) decade of CA transition period from Stark 
and Ahren (2012) 
  
 Table 1 CACs exports, imports and internal trade 
Total Exports (in bln U.S. dollars) 
  1995-99 2000-03 2004-07 2008-11 
By countries 
Kazakhstan 21.9 29.0 64.0 103.4 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.3 1.5 2.2 2.6 
Tajikistan 0.9 0.8 1.7 2.2 
Turkmenistan 4.5 5.9 14.1 18.9 
Uzbekistan 5.7 4.9 11.9 19.8 
 
 
Total Imports (in bln U.S. dollars) 
  1995-99 2000-03 2004-07 2008-11 
By countries 
Kazakhstan 22.3 28.4 66.6 93.4 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.3 1.4 2.5 2.6 
Tajikistan 0.9 0.8 1.9 2.4 
Turkmenistan 4.5 5.6 14.4 28.1 
Uzbekistan 5.7 4.7 13.7 22.0 
 
 
Total Internal trade (in bln U.S. dollars) 
  1995-99 2000-03 2004-07 2008-11 
By countries 
Kazakhstan 20.2 23.4 73.7 135.5 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.6 1.5 3.1 5.1 
Tajikistan 1.0 1.2 3.0 5.8 
Turkmenistan 3.6 7.7 20.0 32.2 
Uzbekistan 14.2 11.1 18.3 38.8 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2013) 
 
  
Table 2 Country list 
Algeria Lithuania 
Austria Moldova 
Azerbaijan Netherlands 
Belarus Norway 
China Poland 
Croatia Romania 
Finland Russian Federation 
France Saudi Arabia 
Georgia Spain 
Germany Switzerland 
Greece Tajikistan 
Hungary Turkey 
India Turkmenistan 
Iran Ukraine 
Italy United Arab Emirates 
Japan United Kingdom 
Kazakhstan United States 
Korea Uzbekistan 
Kyrgyzstan  
  
 Table 3 Descriptive statistics for the variables (n=23274) 
Variable Description Min Max Mean s.d. 
yr Year 1995 2011 2003 4.899 
X_ij Exports, in billions of US dollars 0 1038090 971.21 14862.54
Y_i GDP of exporter, in billions of US 
dollars 
0.569 28062 972.01 2345.5 
Y_j GDP of importer, in billions of US 
dollars 
0.569 28062 972.01 2345.5 
Dist_ij Geographic distance, in km 69.04 11763.9 3512.8 2578.6 
Trf_ij Effectively applied tariffs, in 
percentages 
0 121.04 3.4594 5.6896 
Bor Dummy for common border 
between I and j is 1, otherwise 0 
0 1 0.078 0.2695 
Lang Dummy for common language 
between I and j is 1, otherwise 0 
0 1 0.0394 0.1946 
Col Dummy for common colonial 
history between I and j is 1, 
otherwise 0 
0 1 0.0321 0.1763 
Llock_i Dummy for landlocked I is 1, 
otherwise 0 
0 1 0.4558 0.4980 
Llock_ij Dummy for both landlocked I and j 
is 1, otherwise 0 
0 1 0.1234 0.3289 
RTA_i Dummy for RTA membership of I 
only is 1, otherwise 0 
0 1 0.3389 0.4733 
RTA_ij Dummy for both, I and j, are 
members of the same RTA is 1, 
otherwise 0 
0 1 0.0467 0.2111 
Rad_i Radius of I from (0,0) geographic 
coordinate 
3.6427 17.33361 10.268 3.8370 
Rad_i Radius of j from (0,0) geographic 
coordinate 
3.6427 17.33361 10.268 3.8370 
 
Table 4 Correlation matrix (19522) 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 X_ij(ln) 1.0            
2 Y_i(ln) 0.5730 1           
3 Y_j(ln) 0.4894 0.0403 1          
4 Dist(ln) -0.2440 0.1238 0.1976 1         
5 1+tariff(ln) -0.2336 0.0065 -0.0756 0.3634 1        
6 Bor 0.1384 -0.0216 -0.0321 -0.3260 -0.0424 1       
7 Lang 0.1033 0.0371 0.0171 -0.0467 0.0185 0.2751 1      
8 Col 0.1316 0.0430 0.0462 -0.0728 0.0080 0.2487 0.2890 1     
9 Llock_i -0.3106 -0.1963 -0.1413 0.0387 0.0270 -0.0132 -0.0204 -0.0124 1    
10 Llock_ij -0.1508 -0.2738 -0.2843 -0.1872 -0.1147 0.0979 0.0544 -0.0683 -0.3117 1   
11 RTA_i -0.3697 -0.2484 -0.2212 0.1035 0.1569 0.0276 -0.1166 -0.0399 0.3831 0.1292 1  
12 RTA_ij -0.0264 -0.1897 -0.2136 -0.1406 -0.0587 0.1613 0.1734 0.2310 -0.0861 0.4211 -0.1427 1 
 Table 5 Non-stationarity and cointegration test results 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
 
(a) Phillips-Perron Non-stationarity test 
 Log of exports Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2610)  6495.4 0 2.18e+04 0 
Z Inverse normal  -17.1 0 -95.4 0 
L* Inverse logit t(6234) -29.1 0 -162.7 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared 53.4 0 265.2 0 
 Log of exporter GDP Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  1439.1 1 5220.6 0 
Z Inverse normal  21.3 1 -25.3 0 
L* Inverse logit t(6664) 19.2 1 -26.9 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared -17.5 1 33.5 0 
 Log of importer GDP Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  1439.1 1 5220.6 0 
Z Inverse normal  21.3 1 -25.3 0 
L* Inverse logit t(6664) 19.2 1 -26.9 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared -17.5 1 33.5 0 
 Log of 1+tariffs Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  6777.9 0 2.72e+04 0 
Z Inverse normal  -25.1 0 -127.4 0 
L* Inverse logit t(5994) -37.1 0 -215.5 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared 54.6 0 330.7 0 
 Log of only one in RTA Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  283.7 1 3795.4 0 
Z Inverse normal  11.8 1 -46.9 0 
L* Inverse logit t(2039) 10.7 1 -51.7 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared -33.1 1 14.2 0 
 Log of both  in RTA Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  209.4 1 3631.5 0 
Z Inverse normal  13.7 1 -46.7 0 
L* Inverse logit t(1834) 12.4 1 -52.2 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared -34.1 1 12.1 0 
 
(b) Westerlund ECM cointegration test 
 Exports/GDPi/GDPj/RTAi/RTAij Value Z-value P-value 
Gt   -1.155 50.005 1 
Ga   2.997 77.040 1 
Pa  11.493 101.502 1 
Note: (a) null hypothesis is variable is non-stationary, and (b) null hypothesis is no cointegration. 
  
 Table 6 Gravity regression estimates 
 
  1  2 3 4 5 
Estimation Method DVLS DVLS PPML TSLS FDE  
Options robust and 
clustered errors 
AR  IV robust and 
clustered errors 
Dependent variable: ln of exports
Country specific terms 
Constant  10.10***  12.25*** 20.08*** 5.80***  0.16***
   (1.219) (0.84) (1.079) (0.375) (0.036) 
ln GDP, importer  0.83***  0.71*** 0.59*** 0.66***   0.38*
   (0.047) (0.028) (0.037) (0.011)  (0.17) 
ln GDP, exporter  0.13***  0.06*** 0.48*** 0.30***  0.07** 
   (0.037) (0.012) (0.038) (0.009)  (0.025) 
Time invariant bilateral terms 
ln Distance  ‐1.64***  ‐1.64*** ‐2.23*** ‐1.04*** 
   (0.090) (0.05) (0.102) (0.047) 
Common Border  ‐0.27***  ‐0.30*** ‐1.08*** 0.49** 
   (0.159) (0.142) (0.189) (0.162) 
Common 
Language  0.28  0.29  0.75*  0.43* 
   (0.205) (0.188) (0.340) (0.212) 
Common Colony  0.37  0.34 ‐0.72 0.86*** 
   (0.276) (0.215) (0.285) (0.238) 
One Landlocked  ‐1.38*  ‐2.09* ‐3.51*** ‐1.26*** 
   (0.544) (0.37) (0.254) (0.094) 
Both Landlocked  ‐1.48  ‐2.91 ‐5.14*** ‐1.05*** 
   (1.072) (0.734) (0.451) (0.156) 
Time variant bilateral terms 
ln (1+Tariffs)  ‐0.19***  ‐0.16*** 0.02 ‐0.18***  ‐0.15***
   (0.026) (0.008) (0.097) (0.010) (0.019) 
One in RTA  ‐0.06  ‐0.05 ‐1.78*** ‐0.49  ‐0.03
   (0.438) (0.31) (0.401) (0.098) (0.024) 
Both in RTA  1.45  1.48 0.49 0.73**  0.19***
   (0.880) (0.62) (0.569) (0.224) (0.027) 
Observations  19,522  19,522 23,273 19,522  18,079
Adj. R‐squared  0.82  0.82 0.64 
Notes:	Robust	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	Significance	levels	are	***	p<0.001,	**	p<0.01,	*	p<0.05	
  
Table 7 Tetrad regression estimates 
 
Estimation Method DVLS(RC) DVLS(AR) PPML TSLS(IV) 
  1 2 3 4 
(a) Dependent variable: ln of exports 
 
ln GDP, importer  0.32*** 0.67*** 0.04*** 
   (0.013) (0.019) (0.004) 
ln GDP, exporter  0.23*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 
   (0.012) (0.008) (0.002) 
Ln Tetrad  0.98***  0.95*** 
   (0.002)  (0.007) 
(b) Dependent variable: ln of tetrads 
   
ln Distance  ‐1.62*** ‐1.64*** ‐2.10*** ‐0.63*** 
   (0.09) (0.051) (0.11) (0.081) 
Common Border  ‐0.27 ‐0.29* ‐1.12*** 0.83** 
   (0.161) (0.145) (0.186) (0.285) 
Common 
Language  0.37  0.42*  0.55  0.87* 
   (0.213) (0.190) (0.339) (0.371) 
Common Colony  0.51 0.53* ‐0.56 1.01* 
   (0.283) (0.215) (0.244) (0.407) 
One Landlocked  ‐6.42*** ‐6.41*** ‐6.95*** ‐2.49*** 
   (0.323) (0.298) (0.242) (0.145) 
Both Landlocked  ‐11.4*** ‐11.33*** ‐11.89*** ‐3.46*** 
   (0.614) (0.591) (0.431) (0.226) 
ln (1+Tariffs) ‐0.21*** ‐0.17*** ‐0.01 ‐0.40*** 
   (0.025) (0.009) (0.115) (0.012) 
One in RTA  ‐0.00 ‐0.01 ‐1.03*** ‐0.12*** 
   (0.049) (0.025) (0.189) (0.026) 
Both in RTA  0.47*** 0.37*** 1.73*** 0.87*** 
   (0.051) (0.027) (0.164) (0.027) 
Constant  8.20*** 8.29*** 13.40*** ‐7.28*** 
   (0.971) (0.71) (0.968) (0.658) 
Observations 16.426 16.426 19,166 19,426 
Adj. R‐squared  0.82  0.81 0.31 
Notes:	Robust	standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	Significance	levels	are	***	p<0.001,	**	p<0.01,	*	p<0.05	
  
Table 10 Dyadic and monadic component shares in CACs, (in %) 
 Dyads Monads 
Kazakhstan 58 42 
Kyrgyzstan 50 50 
Tajikistan 8 92 
Turkmenistan 4 96 
Uzbekistan 4 96 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 1 Liberalization processes in CACs 
Kazakhstan is a unitary state with a presidential form of government. Since independence, 
through re-elections, Nursultan Nazarbaev has been the president of the country. Kazakhstan 
has undertaken rapid systemic reforms in early years of its independence to build a democracy 
based on a market-oriented economy. Since early 1990s several reforms were implemented. 
To stabilize the labour market regional and local labour market employment system and wage 
flexibility policies were adopted. Restrictions on internal trade were fully eliminated, the 
regulation of foreign trade was simplified and the exchange rate system unified by the new 
currency, tenge. During the period 1991-1996 as a result of wide price liberalization the 
country experienced high inflation level. Even though privatization reforms were criticized 
for corruption by 2001 50% of large enterprises were privatized. To develop good economic 
and political relationship with major regional players (Russia, China, EU and US), the country 
has adopted “multifactor foreign policy”. The stable political and economic situation and 
discovery of large oil reserves in the Caspian shelf have attracted FDI to the country, 
especially during 2000s when world commodity prices accelerated.  
Kyrgyzstan had presidential form of government until 2010 when it shifted to 
parliamentarian government. Due to high corruption problems the country experienced 
political instability during 2000s resulting in several presidents changes. The current president 
is Almazbek Atambayev. Kyrgyzstan is so far the only CAC WTO member (since 1998). 
Kyrgyzstan did more efforts than Kazakhstan in establishing a market economy and 
democratic society. In early years of independence, the country abolished trade restrictions 
(setting the lowest customs tariffs among CACs), freed capital control, and declared a liberal 
exchange rate regime. As a result of the privatization reforms, by 2003, 93% of all enterprises 
were in private ownership. The banking system initiated in 1991 has bee by 2004 also 
privatised. Price liberalization proceeded in a manner similar as in Kazakhstan but the 
inflation problems were solved quicker (inflation rate below 50% by 1995). However, 
transitional reforms were less successful in the labour market where unemployment has 
remained high (15 - 32% in the first decade of independence) and led to immigration to 
Kazakhstan and Russia.  
Tajikistan experienced civil war in early years of independence (1992-1997). Tajikistan has 
presidential form of government and its president since 1994 till present is Imomali 
Rahmonov. The political problems in the 1990s have slowed the democratization and 
transition to market economy. As a result Tajikistan is one of the poorest CACs (per capita 
income $150 in 2001). The country is perceived as high risk for FDI and has high corruption 
levels. Privatization reforms have been slow as the large companies remain state owned. 
Tajikistan continues to use Soviet ruble and later Russian ruble until 1995 when the country 
introduced its own currency (Tajik ruble) which was later replaced by solomi in 2000. Tight 
monetary policies have brought inflation down (from 60% to 12% by 2002). 
Turkmenistan has a president ruled government within a single party system. Under its first 
president, Saparmurat Niyazov’s rule Turkmenistan had highly centralized government and 
little economical or political reformations were undertaken. After Niyazov’s death in 2006, 
his successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov started some liberal reforms such as 
redesigning the constitution, reforms related to property rights, foreign investment, licensing, 
and lowering customs rates in an attempt to convince investors of country’s economic 
openness; since 2008 cautiously liberalization of financial sector begun. Having less financial 
and trade linkages with the world left Turkmenistan almost unaffected by the global crisis of 
2008. Since 2008 Turkmenistan started more extensive trade liberalization reforms leading to 
trade agreements with Iran, China, and Ukraine in attempt to redirect its gas export and 
become less dependent on Russia. By 2011 64% of enterprises have been privatised but 
profitable businesses were kept under state control. Furthermore, the government is reluctant 
to allow private or foreign owned enterprises in certain sectors (i.e., media). Labour market is 
in poor condition as in 2007 unemployment rate was as high as 60%.  
Uzbekistan like Turkmenistan is another less liberalized CAC with president ruled 
government as the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, is in power since independence. 
Due to the authoritarian political system the transition to market-oriented economy has been 
slow. Even though by 1996 almost all prices were liberalized, enterprise privatization had 
little success and large enterprises in profitable sectors (cotton and wheat) are kept under 
government control. Further, reductions of government intervention, protection of legal rights 
for enterprises, and foreign exchange liberalisation have been halfway fulfilled by authorities 
in later years. Like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan has pursued tight monetary policy which by 
2002 allowed reducing inflation to 7%.  
 
 
Appendix 2 Main Central Asia RTAs (in chronological order) 
• 1991 - Central Asian Commonwealth (CAC) with five members (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) was established; the organization merged with the 
EurAsEC in 2006. 
• 1994 - Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Agreement (CISFTA) was created 
covering all the CIS countries, although by 2009, only eight of its members (Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine) remained, with the 
other CIS countries (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) becoming observers.  
• 1996 - Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was established by Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Belarus. In 2001, these three countries as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a 
treaty to organize a common system of water and energy use. Uzbekistan withdrew from the 
organisation. 
• 1996 - Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed among China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and further in 2001 Uzbekistan joined the group as well. 
• 1998 - Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan joined the WTO (as did Russia in 2012). 
• 2010 - Eurasian Customs Union (EACU) was established between Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Belarus, which is intended to be the first step towards forming “Common Economic Space”, a 
common supranational system of trade and tariffs connecting all CIS countries.  
 
  
Appendix 3.1 Monadic and dyadic content in trade with Kazakhstan  
Country Pairs Exports Monads Dyads  Primary Categories of pairs 
Exporter Importer (in log) 
 
Importer M driven D driven 
Kazakhstan Algeria 1.48 11% 89%      
Kazakhstan Austria 0.97 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Azerbaijan 3.20 11% 89%      
Kazakhstan Belarus 2.01 11% 89%      
Kazakhstan China 2.28 0% 100% 1    1
Kazakhstan Croatia 1.33 23% 77% 1 1  
Kazakhstan Finland 1.12 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan France 1.00 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Georgia 2.07 11% 89%      
Kazakhstan Germany 0.78 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Greece 1.39 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Hungary 1.42 12% 88% 1 1  
Kazakhstan India 2.03 0% 100%      
Kazakhstan 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 1.74 11% 89% 1 1  
Kazakhstan Italy 1.06 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Japan 0.47 0% 100%      
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan 2.26 11% 89% 1 1  
Kazakhstan Korea, Rep. 1.29 0% 100%      
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 1.63 11% 89% 1 1  
Kazakhstan Lithuania 2.25 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Moldova 1.88 11% 89%      
Kazakhstan Netherlands 1.12 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Norway 1.37 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Poland 1.73 0% 100% 1    1
Kazakhstan Romania 2.10 12% 88% 1 1  
Kazakhstan 
Russian 
Federation 2.04 11% 89% 1 1  
Kazakhstan Saudi Arabia 2.03 0% 100%       
Kazakhstan Spain 1.33 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Switzerland 0.76 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan Tajikistan 2.26 11% 89% 1 1   
Kazakhstan Turkey 1.35 12% 88%       
Kazakhstan Turkmenistan 7.13 11% 89% 1 1   
Kazakhstan Ukraine 1.79 11% 89%       
Kazakhstan 
United Arab 
Emirates 2.03 11% 89%       
Kazakhstan 
United 
Kingdom 1.19 0% 100% 1   1
Kazakhstan United States 0.70 30% 70%       
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan 1.42 11% 89% 1 1   
        
Total 
Sum: 24 10 14
        
Match 
level: 100% 42% 58%
 
  
Appendix 3.2  Monadic and Dyadic content in trade with Kyrgyzstan 
Country Pairs Exports Monads Dyads  Primary Categories of pairs 
Exporter Importer 
(in 
logs) 
 
Importer M driven D driven 
Kyrgyzstan Algeria 1.79 0% 100%       
Kyrgyzstan Austria 0.89 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Azerbaijan 3.11 11% 89%       
Kyrgyzstan Belarus 1.92 11% 89%       
Kyrgyzstan China 2.09 0% 100% 1    1
Kyrgyzstan Croatia 0.87 66% 34% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan Finland 1.05 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan France 0.93 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Georgia 1.97 11% 89%       
Kyrgyzstan Germany 0.71 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Greece 1.31 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Hungary 1.26 19% 81% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan India 1.93 0% 100%       
Kyrgyzstan 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 1.65 11% 89%       
Kyrgyzstan Italy 0.99 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Japan 0.33 0% 100%       
Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan 2.17 11% 89% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan Korea, Rep. 1.24 0% 100%       
Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 1.54 11% 89% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan Lithuania 2.08 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Moldova 1.78 11% 89%       
Kyrgyzstan Netherlands 1.05 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Norway 1.30 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Poland 1.46 11% 89% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan Romania 1.95 19% 81% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan 
Russian 
Federation 1.95 11% 89% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan Saudi Arabia 1.94 0% 100%       
Kyrgyzstan Spain 1.26 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Switzerland 0.68 0% 100% 1   1
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan 2.17 11% 89% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan Turkey 1.18 20% 80%       
Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan 7.04 11% 89% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan Ukraine 1.70 11% 89%       
Kyrgyzstan 
United Arab 
Emirates 1.94 11% 89% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan 
United 
Kingdom 1.12 0% 100%       
Kyrgyzstan United States 0.54 39% 61% 1 1   
Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 1.33 11% 89% 1 1   
        
Total 
Sum: 24 12 12
        
Match 
level: 100% 50% 50%
  
Appendix 3.3 Monadic and Dyadic content in trade with Tajikistan 
Country Pairs Exports Monads Dyads  Primary Categories of pairs 
Exporter Importer 
(in 
logs) 
 
Importer M driven D driven 
Tajikistan Algeria 2.01 0% 100%       
Tajikistan Austria 0.64 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan Azerbaijan 3.20 11% 89%       
Tajikistan Belarus 2.01 11% 89%       
Tajikistan China 2.24 0% 100% 1    1
Tajikistan Croatia 0.93 69% 31% 1 1   
Tajikistan Finland 0.79 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan France 0.67 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan Georgia 2.07 11% 89%       
Tajikistan Germany 0.45 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan Greece 1.06 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan Hungary 1.12 47% 53% 1 1   
Tajikistan India 1.49 11% 89%       
Tajikistan 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 1.74 11% 89% 1 1   
Tajikistan Italy 0.73 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan Japan 0.23 10% 90%       
Tajikistan Kazakhstan 2.26 11% 89% 1 1   
Tajikistan Korea, Rep. 1.16 0% 100%       
Tajikistan 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 1.63 11% 89% 1 1   
Tajikistan Lithuania 1.81 46% 54% 1 1   
Tajikistan Moldova 1.88 11% 89%       
Tajikistan Netherlands 0.79 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan Norway 1.04 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan Poland 1.24 47% 53% 1 1   
Tajikistan Romania 1.80 47% 53% 1 1   
Tajikistan 
Russian 
Federation 2.04 11% 89% 1 1   
Tajikistan Saudi Arabia 1.94 0% 100%       
Tajikistan Spain 1.00 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan Switzerland 0.43 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan Tajikistan 2.26 11% 89% 1 1   
Tajikistan Turkey 1.39 0% 100% 1   1
Tajikistan Turkmenistan 7.13 11% 89% 1 1   
Tajikistan Ukraine 1.79 11% 89%       
Tajikistan 
United Arab 
Emirates 2.03 11% 89%       
Tajikistan 
United 
Kingdom 0.86 32% 68% 1 1   
Tajikistan United States 0.87 11% 89%       
Tajikistan Uzbekistan 1.42 11% 89% 1 1   
        
Total 
Sum: 25 23 1
        
Match 
level: 100% 92% 8%
  
Appendix 3.4 Monadic and Dyadic content in trade with Turkmenistan 
Country Pairs Exports Monads Dyads  Primary Categories of pairs 
Exporter Importer 
(in 
logs) 
 
Importer M driven D driven 
Turkmenistan Algeria 2.19 11% 89%       
Turkmenistan Austria 1.49 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Azerbaijan 3.92 11% 89%       
Turkmenistan Belarus 2.72 11% 89%       
Turkmenistan China 3.00 0% 100% 1    1
Turkmenistan Croatia 1.81 50% 50% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Finland 1.64 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan France 1.52 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Georgia 2.78 11% 89%       
Turkmenistan Germany 1.30 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Greece 1.91 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Hungary 2.08 18% 82% 1 1   
Turkmenistan India 2.66 0% 100%       
Turkmenistan 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 2.45 11% 89% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Italy 1.59 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Japan 0.90 15% 85%       
Turkmenistan Kazakhstan 2.97 11% 89% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Korea, Rep. 1.85 0% 100%       
Turkmenistan 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 2.34 11% 89% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Lithuania 2.76 18% 82% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Moldova 2.59 11% 89%       
Turkmenistan Netherlands 1.64 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Norway 1.89 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Poland 2.21 17% 83% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Romania 2.76 18% 82% 1 1   
Turkmenistan 
Russian 
Federation 2.75 11% 89% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Saudi Arabia 2.75 0% 100%       
Turkmenistan Spain 1.85 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Switzerland 1.28 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Tajikistan 2.97 11% 89% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Turkey 1.99 20% 80% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Turkmenistan 7.84 11% 89% 1 1   
Turkmenistan Ukraine 2.51 11% 89%       
Turkmenistan 
United Arab 
Emirates 2.74 11% 89%       
Turkmenistan 
United 
Kingdom 1.71 15% 85% 1 1   
Turkmenistan United States 1.49 22% 78%       
Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 2.13 11% 89% 1 1   
        
Total 
Sum: 25 24   
        
Match 
level: 100% 96% 4%
  
Appendix 3.5 Monadic and Dyadic content in trade with Uzbekistan 
Country Pairs Exports Monads Dyads  Primary Categories of pairs 
Exporter Importer 
(in 
logs) 
 
Importer M driven D driven 
Uzbekistan Algeria 1.35 10% 90%       
Uzbekistan Austria 0.62 19% 81% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Azerbaijan 3.08 10% 90%       
Uzbekistan Belarus 1.89 11% 89%       
Uzbekistan China 1.79 16% 84% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Croatia 1.14 31% 69% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Finland 0.78 19% 81% 1 1   
Uzbekistan France 0.66 20% 80% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Georgia 1.94 10% 90%       
Uzbekistan Germany 0.44 20% 80% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Greece 1.04 19% 81% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Hungary 1.19 24% 76% 1 1   
Uzbekistan India 1.87 0% 100%       
Uzbekistan 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 1.62 10% 90% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Italy 0.72 19% 81% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Japan 0.10 20% 80%       
Uzbekistan Kazakhstan 2.14 11% 89% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Korea, Rep. 1.02 0% 100%       
Uzbekistan 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 1.51 11% 89% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Lithuania 1.90 20% 80% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Moldova 1.75 10% 90%       
Uzbekistan Netherlands 0.77 18% 82% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Norway 1.03 19% 81% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Poland 1.35 21% 79% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Romania 1.87 24% 76% 1 1   
Uzbekistan 
Russian 
Federation 1.92 11% 89% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Saudi Arabia 1.93 0% 100%       
Uzbekistan Spain 0.99 19% 81% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Switzerland 0.41 20% 80% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Tajikistan 2.14 11% 89% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Turkey 1.41 0% 100% 1    1
Uzbekistan Turkmenistan 7.01 11% 89% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Ukraine 1.67 10% 90%       
Uzbekistan 
United Arab 
Emirates 1.91 10% 90%       
Uzbekistan 
United 
Kingdom 0.85 19% 81% 1 1   
Uzbekistan United States 0.71 14% 86% 1 1   
Uzbekistan Uzbekistan 1.30 11% 89% 1 1   
        
Total 
Sum: 26 25   
        
Match 
level: 100% 96% 4%
 
